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AN ARGUMENT FOR THE DELETION OF THE 
CRIME OF AGGRESSION FROM THE ROME 
STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL 
COURT          
Steven Nicholas Haskos* 
 
I.   INTRODUCTION  
The Review Conference of the Assembly of the State Parties to the 
Rome Statute governing the International Criminal Court (“Rome Sta-
tute”) will commence on May 31st, 2010, and is scheduled to conclude on 
June 11, 2010, in Kampala, Uganda.
1
  The primary objective of the Re-
view Conference is twofold: to agree on a definition of the international 
crime of aggression, and to establish the conditions necessary for the ex-
ercise of jurisdiction over individuals charged with aggression.
2
  In a 
world increasingly afflicted with large-scale displays of force which 
cloud the old conceptions of just war, the significance of the conference 
is paramount.  Bill Pace, a member of the Coalition for the International 
Criminal Court, described the coming task of the Review Conference as 
“one of the most consequential endeavours in international law ever at-
tempted.”
3
         
On July 17, 1998, the final draft of the Rome Statute of the Interna-
tional Criminal Court was completed.
4
  The drafters of the Rome Statute 
                                                             
* B.A., Providence College, 2007; J.D. candidate, Pace University School of Law, 
2011. 
1 Press Release, United Nations, Press Conference by President of Assembly of State 
Parties to Rome Statute of International Criminal Court (Dec. 3, 2009).  
2 Id.  
3 Andrew Gilligan, International Criminal Court Proposes Powers to Try Politi-
cians who Wage “Illegal Wars”, THE DAILY TELEGRAPH, Jan. 30, 2010, available at 
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/7112241/Inter-national-Criminal-Court-
proposes-powers-to-try-politicians-who-wage-illegal-wars.html. 
4 See generally Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, July 17, 1998 [he-
reinafter Rome Statute]. 
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sought to provide the new court with jurisdiction over cases involving 
the most serious crimes of international concern.  Article 5 of the Rome 
Statute lists the crime of genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes, 
and the crime of aggression
5
, as the offenses sufficiently grave in nature 
as to warrant the court‟s attention.  The Rome Statute defines each of 
these offenses with the exception of the crime of aggression.  The elu-
siveness of the concept of aggression survives today, as more than ten 
years have passed since the Rome Statute‟s inception; yet, the crime is 
still undefined, and thus, no prosecution for this severe offense can be 
initiated in the International Criminal Court (“ICC”).
6
 
The struggles endured by the drafters of the Rome Statute in charac-
terizing aggression are by no means coincidental; rather, it suggests an 
incompatibility between the enforcement of the offense and the aims of 
the court.  Accordingly, the crime of aggression should be omitted from 
the Rome Statute.    
This comment will address not only the problems in constructing a 
working definition, but also the substantial obstacles posed by other pro-
visions of the Rome Statute.  An overview of the history of the develop-
ment and the prosecution of aggression will be included in section II of 
this comment, focusing on its evolution prior to, during, and after the 
Nuremberg and Tokyo Tribunals.  Section III discusses the political 
overtones which permeate issues of aggression thereby rendering the 
ICC unsuitable to hear such cases.  Section IV notes the problems of 
identifying and punishing individual criminal defendants for aggression; 
a crime which inherently requires state action.  Section V analyzes article 
25 of the Rome Statute, which deals with various forms of criminal lia-
bility, and suggests that aggression, as a “leadership crime,” is inconsis-
tent with the enumerated forms of liability recognized by the ICC.  Last-
ly,  defenses to aggression located both in and out of the Rome Statute 
are discussed in section VI.   
II.   EVOLUTION OF THE CRIME OF AGGRESSION  
A.  The Crime of Aggression Prior to Nuremberg 
An analysis of the crime of aggression requires an understanding of 
the distinction between jus ad bellum and jus in bello, with the former 
                                                             
5 Id. art. 5.  
6 Id. art. 5(2).  
2http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol23/iss1/7
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being the applicable doctrine.  Jus ad bellum refers to the set of rules go-
verning the decision to use force (i.e. aggression), while jus in bello is 
invoked once the decision to use force has been made, regulating the le-
gality of the type of force used.  This distinction dates back to ancient 
times, and was often couched in terms of “just war”.  Distinctions be-
tween a just versus an unjust war were made in ancient India, Greece, 
China, and within the Islamic tradition.
7
  Centuries later, St. Thomas 
Aquinas , in his Summa Theologicae, enumerated three requirements for 
a war to be deemed just: first, a legitimate sovereign power must have 
authorized it; second, the war must be commenced to obtain a just cause; 
and third, the force must not be aimed at furthering injustice, but rather, 
restoring order.
8
   
Despite these early ideas, the concept did not materially evolve until 
World War I.  At the war‟s conclusion in 1919, under article 227 of the 
Versailles Treaty of Peace, plans were made to hold Kaiser Wilhelm II 
criminally responsible for “a supreme offence against international mo-
rality and the sanctity of treaties.”
9
  Further evidence of the international 
community‟s recognition of criminality in an unjust war lies in the words 
of former English Prime Minister David Lloyd George‟s memoirs. When 
commenting about the interwar period, Lloyd George describes “a grow-
ing feeling that war itself was a crime against humanity, and that it would 
never be finally eliminated until it was brought into the same category as 
all other crimes by the infliction of condign punishment on the perpetra-
tors and instigators.”
10
  The aftermath of World War I continued to 
promulgate anti-aggression legislation, including in 1924 when the 
League of Nations sponsored the Draft Treaty of Mutual Assistance 
which directly stated “aggressive war is an international crime.”
11
  This 
sentiment reached its new pinnacle in 1928 with the signing of the Pact 
of Paris, or as it is more commonly known, the Kellogg-Briand Pact.  
This treaty was originally meant to alleviate tense relations between the 
United States and France, but was eventually opened to all nations.
12
  
                                                             
7 BETH VAN SCHAACK & RONALD C. SLYE, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW AND ITS 
ENFORCEMENT: CASES AND MATERIALS 317 (2007). 
8 Id. 
9 Noah Weisbord, Prosecuting Aggression, 49 HARVARD INT‟L L.J. 161, 162 (2008).  
10 Id. 
11 Id. at 163.  
12 Jonathan A. Bush, “The Supreme…Crime” and its Origins: The Lost Legislative 
History of the Crime of Aggressive War, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 2324, 2334 (2002).  
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The ambitious goal of the treaty was to outlaw war altogether, binding 
the parties to “condemn recourse to war for the solution of international 
controversies, and renounce it as an instrument of national policy in their 
relations with one another.”
13
       
In the period between the signing of the Kellogg-Briand Pact and 
World War II, there was a relative lull regarding discussion of the crime 
of aggression.  In 1938, in the wake of the Anschluss (the annexation of 
Austria), previous advancements in the prohibition of aggression ap-
peared minimal.  In 1945, the charter of the United Nations was signed,
14
 
bringing aggression back to the forefront.  During its drafting, the ques-
tion of whether aggressive war amounts to a criminal act, was deemed to 
be the most important substantive issue to be resolved.
15
  The charter 
eventually imposed a duty on the signatory states to abstain from the use 
or threat of force
16
, though the ban is not absolute (discussed infra).  The 
charter assigns the power to recognize and remedy acts of aggression, 
and to maintain international peace, to the Security Council.
17
  The inter-
national significance of this document does not rest solely in its procla-
mations, but rather in its scope, as the reach of nations pulled within the 
ambit of this non-aggression pact greatly outnumbered those past.  The 
charter‟s substance would also prove influential, as the powers delegated 
to the Security Council bear greatly on the possible inclusion of the 
crime of aggression within the jurisdiction of the ICC. 
B.  The Crime of Aggression under the Nuremberg and Tokyo Tribunals 
The magnitude and the severity of the events which transpired dur-
ing the Second World War tested the practicality of the previously ab-
stract ideas of aggression.  At the conclusion of the war a cosmic shift 
occurred, whereby the actual prosecution of aggression, as opposed to 
the construction of its definition, led to the prosecution of individuals re-
sponsible for the crime, rather than focusing on state liability.  The allied 
powers recognized the need to not only punish German individuals for 
                                                             
13 Id.   
14 See generally Charter of the United Nations [hereinafter UN Charter], June 26, 
1945.  
15 Weisbord, supra note 9, at 164 (quoting UNITED NATIONS WAR CRIMES 
COMMISSION, HISTORY OF THE UNITED NATIONS WAR CRIMES COMMISSION AND THE 
DEVELOPMENT OF THE LAWS OF WAR 180 (1948)). 
16 UN Charter, art. 2(4). 
17 UN Charter, art. 39-42.  
4http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol23/iss1/7
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waging such a war, but also bringing the political, social, and economic 
institutions of the country into harmony with the rest of Europe to avoid 
future wars of aggression.
18
  Thus, the decision was made to impose in-
dividual criminal liability.   
The Agreement for the Prosecution and the Punishment of the Ma-
jor War Criminals of the European Axis (known as the “London Agree-
ment), and the Charter of the International Military Tribunal (“Nurem-
berg Charter”) cemented this decision by stating, “crimes against 
international law are committed by men, not abstract entities, and only 
by punishing individuals who commit such crimes can the provisions of 
international law be enforced.”
19
  The Nuremberg Charter further stipu-
lates that representatives of a state may not be protected by their official 
positions when their individual acts are deemed criminal by international 
law.
20
  These provisions rest on the Charter‟s principle that “individuals 
have international duties which transcend the national obligations of ob-
edience imposed by individual states.”
21
            
In order to successfully prosecute the war criminals of the Axis 
powers, the delegates drafting the Nuremberg charter needed to circum-
vent the legality principles which prohibited retroactive legislation, 
namely, nullum crimen sine lege (“no crime without law”).  Thus, the 
delegates were faced with the additional task of basing their prosecution 
on established international law.  Justice Robert Jackson was the Ameri-
can representative involved in the formation of the Nuremberg Charter in 
London.  Jackson was influential in defining the crime of aggression in a 
universal way, as opposed to the Soviet position which centered specifi-
cally on Nazi or Axis aggression.
22
  This position was more compatible 
with previous efforts by the international community to outlaw aggres-
sion such as the Kellogg-Briand Pact and the Hague Conventions.  Legis-
lation stemming from these endeavors criminalized undertaking an ag-
gressive war, yet they failed to provide individual criminal sanctions.
23
  
                                                             
18 Grant M. Dawson, Defining Substantive Crimes Within the Subject Matter Juris-
diction of the International Criminal Court: What is the Crime of Aggression?, 19 N.Y.L. 
SCH. J. INT‟L & COMP. L. 413, 421-422 (2000).  
19 Id. at 422.  
20 Id.  
21 Id.  
22 Bush, supra note 12, at 2369.  
23 Christoph Burchard, The Nuremberg Trial and its Impact on Germany, 4 J. INT‟L 
CRIM. JUST. 800, 809 (2006).   
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Judgments rendered under the Nuremberg Tribunal rectified this discre-
pancy stating that such sanctions were implicit in the documents.
24
  
While this rationalization effectively ended the dispute regarding retroac-
tive legislation, it did not stop the German detractors from commenting 
on its insufficiency.  Georg Dahm, a prominent German attorney, stated 
that the Nuremberg Tribunal took “very many liberties”
25
 in jumping 
from the concept that outlawing war suggested responsibility of the state 
aggressor, to a model targeting individual responsibility and punishment.            
The efforts of the various representatives involved in the drafting of 
the Nuremberg Charter culminated in the inclusion of the crime of ag-
gression in an umbrella category referred to as crimes against the peace.  
The charter defined crimes against the peace as follows:  
The tribunal established by the Agreement referred to in Article 1 hereof 
for the trial and punishment of the major war criminals of the European 
Axis countries shall have the power to try and punish persons who, acting 
in the interests of the European Axis countries, whether as individuals or as 
members of organizations, committed any of the following crimes.  The 
following acts, or any of them, are crimes coming within the jurisdiction of 
the tribunal for which there shall be individual responsibility: crimes 
against peace: namely, planning, preparation, initiation, or waging of a war 
of aggression, or a war in violation of international treaties, agreements or 
assurances, or participation in a common plan or conspiracy for the accom-
plishment of any of the foregoing.26 
Once the statutory definition was finalized, the prosecutor indicted 
twenty-two defendants for crimes against the peace, and convicted 
eight.
27
  Two of the cases, involving defendants Hermann Wilhelm Goer-
ing and Hjalmar Schact, illustrate the application of the statute by the 
Tribunal.  Goering was the active agent of Hitler, largely responsible for 
bringing the Nazi party together, creating the first concentration camps, 
and as Luftwaffe chief, planned unnecessary air offensives.
28
  As the 
second in command only to Hitler, Goering was instrumental in the 
German military effort, and was accordingly found guilty of crimes 
against the peace, or aggression.  Conversely, Schact was not found cri-
minally responsible for aggression.  Schact was a pivotal figure in Ger-
                                                             
24 Id.  
25 Id. at 809-10.  
26 Charter of the International Military Tribunal and Protocol of 6 October 1945 [he-
reinafter Nuremberg Charter], Aug. 8, 1945.  
27 Van Schaack, supra note 7, at 332.  
28 Id. at 329.  
6http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol23/iss1/7
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many‟s rearmament program, but his motive was found to be strictly na-
tionalistic, as he believed rearmament would place Germany on an equal 
basis with other European powers.
29
  Evidence showed that Schact‟s ef-
forts slowed once he discovered that the Nazis were rearming for aggres-
sive purposes; also, Schact was not involved in any capacity in the plan-
ning of aggressive wars.
30
 
This case clearly identifies a requisite mens rea, despite the statute‟s 
silence on the subject.  Knowledge appears to be required, as Schact was 
clearly involved in many of the prescribed actus rea, including planning 
and preparation, yet his ignorance regarding the ultimate aims of the 
rearmament program led to his exculpation.     
Despite using the same definition for crimes against the peace, one 
important distinction existed between the Nuremberg Tribunal and the 
International Military Tribunal for the Far East (“Tokyo Tribunal”).  The 
prosecutors in Tokyo sought to superimpose the jus ad bello onto the jus 
ad bellum.  The prosecution argued that the Japanese, in waging an ag-
gressive war in violation of the jus ad bellum, lost their right to use vi-
olence permitted under jus ad bello.
31
  The actions of the Japanese di-
vested the Japanese defendants of the protection of the laws regulating 
the means used during war.  Alternatively, did the restraining rules under 
jus ad bello apply to the allies should they be found to have been victims 
of an aggressive war?  The Tokyo Tribunal did not adjudicate this matter 
however, as the guilt of the defendants was the sole issue.
32
  The signi-
ficance of this question should not be understated, as the answer may 
place the crime of aggression above other international crimes.  A deter-
mination that an aggressive war was waged may either implicate or ab-
solve both the aggressor and the victim of war crimes, crimes against 
humanity, or even genocide.  
C.  The Crime of Aggression between Nuremberg and the International 
Criminal Court 
The prosecutions at the Nuremberg and Tokyo Tribunals were an 
                                                             
29 Id. at 331. 
30 Id.   
31 Allison Marston Danner, Beyond the Geneva Conventions: Lessons from the 
Tokyo Tribunal in Prosecuting War and Terrorism, 46 VA. J. INT‟L L. 83, 99 (2005).  
32 Id. 
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important step in the international community‟s prosecution of the crime 
of aggression.  An equally important step came in 1974, via resolution 
number 3314, when the General Assembly of the United Nations issued 
its own definition of aggression in an attempt to help guide the Security 
Council in its determinations of what constitutes the offense.
33
  The Gen-
eral Assembly defines aggression as “the use of armed force by a State 
against the sovereignty, territorial integrity or political independence of 
another State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the [U.N.] Char-
ter of the United Nations, as set out in this Definition.”
34
  Article 2 of the 
same statute stipulates that the first sign of force constitutes prima facie 
evidence of aggression, although the Security Council may determine 
that such an act was justified.
35
  Article 3 lists the substantive acts which 
may qualify as an act of aggression. 
In enumerating various substantive acts, the General Assembly 
sought to assist the Security Council in its difficult determination of 
whether certain acts constitute aggression.  However, each of the acts are 
subject to defenses listed or implied throughout the U.N. Charter, includ-
ing self-defense, humanitarian intervention, and self-determination.  Ac-
cordingly, a determination of aggression requires weighing the substan-
tive act(s) against any possible defenses.    
III.  THE POLITICAL NATURE OF THE CRIME OF AGGRESSION  
One of the ways in which the ICC can exercise jurisdiction over 
those designated crimes is through a referral to the prosecutor by a state 
party.
36
  The ICC‟s critics have frequently cited this provision as being 
susceptible to abuse.  A principle concept in both international and do-
mestic law (within the United States), is that issues which are political in 
nature are not justiciable.  Allowing such referral permits masking a po-
litically motivated agenda with the appearance of a criminal prosecution.  
Both the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia and 
the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda omitted the crime of ag-
                                                             
33 See generally Sergey Sayapin, The Definition of the Crime of Aggression for the 
Purpose of the International Criminal Court: Problems and Perspectives, 13 J. CONFLICT 
& SECURITY L. 333 (2008).  
34 G.A. Res. 3314 (XXIX), U.N. GAOR, 29th Sess., Supp. No. 31 at 143, U.N. Doc. 
A/9631 (Dec. 14, 1974).  
35 Id. §3314(2).  
36 Rome Statute, art. 13(a). 
8http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol23/iss1/7
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gression
37
 fearing that the courts would be adjudicating political matters, 
which is both contrary to the court‟s purpose and incapable of a solution 
via judicial measures.    
The crime of aggression is often deeply entwined with concepts 
such as territorial disputes, arms control, and other matters of foreign 
policy.  The problem is twofold.  First, states will likely take advantage 
of the court‟s jurisdiction over aggression, seeking favorable resolutions 
to matters regarding foreign relations.  This would inevitably force the 
ICC to exhaust its resources in an attempt to understand the causes and 
motives of war, as opposed to prosecuting those individuals committing 
international crimes.  This threat of abuse is also harmful in that it may 
serve as a deterrent to a state contemplating becoming a party to the 
Rome Statute.  A signatory state may refer acts which they deem as 
crimes of aggression to the ICC
38
, despite the accused party‟s feeling that 
they are acting within the applicable jus ad bellum.  Individuals from the 
accused state may then be subject to criminal liability based on a singular 
court‟s perception of a just war.  Article 12(2)(a) of the Rome Statute al-
lows for jurisdiction over cases in which the conduct in question oc-
curred on the territory of a state party.
39
  Therefore, should a state decide 
that the use of force is necessary and legal, by entering the territory of a 
signatory state, such a legal determination is ceded to the ICC without 
ever consenting to the jurisdiction of the court.  Accordingly, even with-
out signing the Rome Statute, parties may be criminally liable to a statute 
criminalizing aggression.    
Jurisdiction based on article 12(2)(a) remains a primary reason for 
the United States‟ opposition to the ICC.  The objection is that, by bind-
ing non-state party‟s to jurisdiction, the Rome Statute, and more particu-
larly article 12(2)(a), violates basic treaty principles.
40
  Article 34 of the 
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties states that a “treaty does not 
                                                             
37 James Nicholas Boeving, Aggression, International Law, and the ICC: An Argu-
ment for the Withdrawal of Aggression from the Rome Statute, 43 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT‟L 
L. 557, 582-3 (2005).  
38 Rome Statute, art. 14. 
39 Id. art. 12(2)(a). 
40 Corrina Heyder, The U.N. Security Council’s Referral of the Crimes in Darfur to 
the International Criminal Court in Light of U.S. Opposition to the Court: Implications 
for the International Criminal Court’s Functions and Status, 24 BERKELEY J. INT‟L L. 
650, 665 (2006). 
9
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create either obligations or rights for a third State without its consent.”
41
  
The crime of aggression inherently involves action taken by individuals 
in foreign territories; thus, the potential for conflict stemming from non-
state parties being bound to jurisdiction is greater than in cases involving 
the other crimes enumerated in the Rome Statute.         
The second major problem with adjudicating cases tangled with po-
litical issues is that the integrity of the court will be compromised, as po-
litical matters can hardly be rectified by the prosecution of individuals.  
Differences amongst states will persevere through an individual prosecu-
tion, as it is increasingly rare that an aggressive war is waged by one per-
son.  Outside of an absolute dictatorship, the prosecution of one individ-
ual is neither a solution nor a deterrent to states pursuing their interests 
via aggressive means.     
The difficulty of adjudicating cases with political overtones was 
seen in the International Court of Justice (“ICJ”), in a case involving the 
United States and Nicaragua.  The United States opposed the Sandinista 
government of Nicaragua and was accused of efforts to undermine the 
regime, including cutting off aid, supporting the Contras (a counter-
revolutionary force), and using unilaterally-controlled Latino assets 
(“UCLA‟s”)
42
 to engage in covert actions.
43
  The Nicaraguan govern-
ment claimed that the Contras and UCLA‟s were acting as agents of the 
United States
44
, thus the latter was accused of aggression under article 
2(4) of the UN Charter.  The ICJ agreed with Nicaragua, ignoring the 
United States claim that they were acting in collective self-defense on 
behalf of El Salvador, Honduras, and Costa Rica pursuant to the Inter-
American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance.
45
              
The relevance of the case stems not only from the merits, but also 
the reaction of the United States.  Along with their defense, the United 
States also challenged the jurisdiction of the ICJ by renouncing their 
                                                             
41 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 34, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 
331.  
42 UCLA was a term coined by the CIA. It referred to special operatives, many of 
whom were from Central America, used by the CIA during the American effort to assist 
in overthrowing the socialist Sandinista government. These UCLA‟s would sabotage 
ports, refineries, and other locations critical to the Nicaraguan government.  
43 Davis B. Tyner, Internationalization of War Crimes Prosecutions: Correcting the 
International Criminal  Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia’s Folly in Tadic, 18 FLA. J. 
INT‟L L. 843, 850 (2006).  
44 Id. at 851.  
45 See Military and Paramiltary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), 
1986 I.C.J. 14 (June 27). 
10http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol23/iss1/7
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consent to jurisdiction.
46
  The court issued its decision anyway, yet the 
United States refused to comply, and could not be compelled to do so by 
virtue of their position as a P-5 member of the Security Council.
47
  This 
case represents an example of a state circumventing a judicial decision 
which carries political reverberations.  While the ICJ does not require 
convictions of individuals, the disconnect between political policy and 
judicial determination of aggression is clear.  These complexities will be 
magnified when the ICC adjudicates such a case, particularly because a 
preliminary determination would need to be made to determine which 
individuals are “most responsible” for carrying out the alleged aggres-
sion.  
The role of the U.N. Security Council in preventing aggression may 
also force the ICC to gravitate towards rendering political decisions.  
Section 5(2) of the Rome Statute explicitly states that jurisdiction over 
the crime of aggression, once a definition is accepted, “shall be consis-
tent with the relevant provisions of the Charter of the United Nations.”
48
  
The Security Council determines acts of aggression by a state, and such 
individual acts which the ICC may have jurisdiction over are linked to 
the state aggression.  Thus, the ICC will be dependent on the Security 
Council, a political body, to enforce its aims. Were the Security Council 
to determine that non-involvement in a particular matter would best serve 
the peace effort, this political decision would block the ICC‟s efforts in 
prosecution.  Similarly, a political agenda may motivate the Security 
Council to act, thereby forcing the hand of the ICC to initiate prosecu-
tions, even if they would not have prosecuted otherwise.    
IV.  THE CRIME OF AGGRESSION IS PREDICATED ON STATE 
LIABILITY 
A.  The Problem of Determining “effective control” 
Regardless of which judicial or political body constructed the sta-
tute, all inquiries into alleged acts of aggression begin with an investiga-
tion of the actions of a state challenging the sovereignty of another.  The 
                                                             
46 See id.  
47 Id. P5 stands for the permanent five members of the U.N. Security Council. Each 
member of the P5 has the power to veto any substantive resolution.  Along with the Unit-
ed States, Russia, China, France, and Great Britain make up the group. 
48 Rome Statute, art. 5(2).  
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ultimate question is whether specific instances of armed force reach the 
requisite level of criminal aggression.  The Special Working Group for 
the Crime of Aggression (“Special Working Group”) has been working 
to create a definition of the crime of aggression which would ultimately 
be adopted by the ICC.  One of their proposed statutes defines the crime 
as “the planning, preparation, initiation or execution, by a person in a po-
sition effectively to exercise control over or to direct the political or mili-
tary action of a state, of an act of aggression which, by its character, 
gravity and scale, constitutes a manifest violation of the Charter of the 
United Nations.”
49
  Section 2 of the statute defines an act of aggression 
as “the use of armed force by a State against the sovereignty, territorial 
integrity or political independence of another State, or in any other man-
ner inconsistent with the Charter of the United Nations”.
50
  
The Special Working Group has defined the crime of aggression as 
“a leadership crime that can only be committed by individuals in a posi-
tion to „exercise control over or to direct the political or military action 
of a State.‟”
51
  This requirement is always included by any group defin-
ing aggression yet it presents a discernible problem for future prosecu-
tions in the ICC.  Determining which individuals are most responsible for 
the actions of an entire state are not as clear as one may presume.  For 
example, private economic actors may be directly involved in the plan-
ning, preparation or initiation of waging aggressive wars, and may even 
be involved in the enumerated actus rea, yet proving that such an actor 
has effective control over the political or military operations is very dif-
ficult.  Accordingly, should the ICC be unable to satisfy this requirement 
of effective control, it may target the head of state by default, a decision 
which may not be appropriate.  Prosecuting a default individual, for ar-
guably the most serious offense in international law, severely damages 
the credibility of the ICC. 
Similarly, actions by parties who are nationals of a third state may 
pose a significant burden on the ICC‟s ability to prosecute.  Though the 
third party may be intimately involved in the waging of the crime of ag-
gression, demonstrating that he or she had effective control over a sove-
                                                             
49 Report of the Special Working Group for the Crime of Aggression, ICC-
ASP/8/Res.6 (Nov. 26, 2009), available at http://www.icc-
cpi.int/iccdocs/asp_docs/Resolutions/ICC-ASP-8-Res.6-ENG.pdf, at 4. 
50 Id.  
51 Kevin Jon Heller, Retreat from Nuremberg: The Leadership Requirement in the 
Crime of Aggression, 18 EUR. J. INT‟L L. 477, 478 (2007).  
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reign state of which they are not a national would be difficult.  Suppor-
ters of the crime of aggression‟s inclusion in the Rome Statute may point 
out that third parties can exercise control over another state through 
coercion.  This seems unlikely however, as acts of aggression are usually 
the means by which coercion is employed, rather than its object.   
These issues highlight the blanket problem that exists by bifurcating 
the prosecution of crimes of aggression.  The crime of aggression is the 
sole offense within the jurisdiction of the ICC that does not govern jus in 
bello, or the legality of the means of force.  Requiring an initial determi-
nation of state aggression by a political body (Security Council or the 
General Assembly), followed by a finding of individual liability in the 
court, forces the two entities to correlate.  This is not necessary however, 
as the protection afforded to individuals under the crime of genocide, 
crimes of humanity, and war crimes is comprehensive.  The relationship 
between jus ad bellum and jus in bello is meant to be complementary.  
The legality of the decision to use force (jus ad bellum) necessitates an 
inquiry into state action, and often involves foreign policy best left out-
side the court.  Eliminating the ICC‟s jurisdiction over such a crime will 
not lead to criminals evading prosecution.  This is evidenced by the Nu-
remberg Tribunal, where “all but one of the defendants who were con-
victed of crimes against peace were also convicted of other offenses, 
such as crimes against humanity or genocide.”
52
  Should the Security 
Council find a state to be guilty of aggressive war, the ICC then has the 
ability to prosecute the likely offenders which ordinarily permeate an ag-
gressive war.  It is possible that an aggressive war yields no war crimes, 
yet the Security Council has ample authority to handle the violation of 
jus ad bellum.  Involving the ICC would simply complicate the matter.  
B.  The Crime of Aggression Deviates from the Court’s Emphasis on 
Protecting the Victim 
The increasingly common prosecution of individuals under interna-
tional criminal law has been matched by a parallel trend; a trend which 
has seen the focus of the international community shift from the perpe-
trators to the victims.  This trend began with the promulgation of the 
United Nations Declaration of Basic Principles of Justice for Victims of 
Crimes and Abuse of Power (“Declaration on Victims Rights”) in 
                                                             
52 Boeving, supra note 37, at 594. 
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1985.
53
  This document, referred to as the “Magna Carta” of victims 
rights
54
, defines who qualifies as a victim, and provides four means of 
redress for victims.
55
  While this is not a binding document, it was in-
fluential in shaping the focus of the various international criminal tribun-
als.  Criminal prosecutions, and thus prosecutors, became mindful of vic-
tim‟s rights, as opposed to strictly concentrating on the guilt of the 
perpetrator.  Both the ICTY and the ICTR took note of the Declaration, 
enacting provisions guaranteeing a fair trial, “with . . . due regard for the 
protection of victims.”
56
   
The ICC implemented similar provisions, demonstrating a recogniz-
able effort to both support and vindicate victims of international crimes.  
Article 68 of the Rome Statute requires the court to “take appropriate 
measures to protect the safety, physical and psychological well-being, 
dignity and privacy of victims and witnesses.”
57
  The Rome Statute goes 
beyond mere protection, and even encourages the participation of victims 
in proceedings.  The ICC‟s Rules of Procedure permit a victim to 
represent his or her own interests before the court.
58
  Further, victims are 
allowed to submit observations to the court regarding the admissibility of 
matters
59
, and if their interests are affected by the case, they may present 
their views and concerns during the proceeding.
60
  Victims‟ rights in the 
ICC extend beyond their contributions within the courtroom.  Rule 16 of 
the ICC‟s Rules of Procedure and Evidence requires the Registrar of the 
court to assist the victims in obtaining legal advice, as well as providing 
the legal representation with support, including necessary facilities.
61
   
Jurisdiction by the ICC over the crime of aggression is inconsistent 
with the court‟s increasing focus on the victim throughout the judicial 
                                                             
53  Symposium, Michael Bachrach, The Protection and Rights of Victims under In-
ternational Criminal Law, 34 INT‟L L. 7, 9 (2000).  
54 Id.  
55 Id.  
56 Boeving, supra note 37, at 584 (quoting Statute of the International Criminal Tri-
bunal for the Former Yugoslavia, S.C. Res. 827, U.N. Doc. S/RES/827 (1993); Statute of 
the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, S.C. Res. 955, U.N. Doc. S/RES/955 
(1994), available at http:// www.ictr.org/ENGLISH/basicdocs/statute.html). 
57 Rome Statute,  art. 68(1).  
58 Boeving, supra note 37, at 586 (citing Rome Statute, art. 15(3)). 
59 Rome Statute, art. 19(3).  
60 Id. art. 68(3).  
61Rules of Procedure and Evidence, Rule 16(1)(b), ICC Doc. ICC-ASP/1/3 (Sept. 
2002), available at http://www.amicc.org/docs/Rules_of_Proc_and_Ev-id_070704-
EN.pdf, at 25. 
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process.  Much as the problem of state criminality obscures individual 
prosecution of aggression, states as victims pose a similar obstacle.  
While it can be argued that there are countless individual victims of an 
aggressive war, it is usually the weakened position of the attacked state‟s 
status within world affairs which suffers most.  Often, the individual vic-
tims of an aggressive war are designated as such because of the occur-
rence of war crimes, crimes against humanity, or the crime of genocide 
which flow from the state act of aggression.  The act of aggression itself 
will have one victim, the state entity.  The Rome Statute itself, in article 
25, states that the court will have jurisdiction over “natural persons,”
62
 
not legal persons, which is often the designation for states. 
In addition to this incompatibility, the role of the victim in the pros-
ecution of aggression is often severely skewed, invalidating any future 
court opinion regarding the matter.  The issue of victor‟s justice, where-
by the militarily successful state in a conflict prosecutes the vanquished, 
was one of the great criticisms of both the Nuremberg and the Tokyo 
Tribunals.  While the ICC‟s justices are presumably neutral, history has 
taught us that those charged with the crime of aggression are only those 
aggressive parties who were defeated in the conflict (victor‟s justice).  In 
this respect, prosecution is punishment not simply for violating the law, 
but violating the law and suffering military defeat, thus subjecting one-
self to the power of another state.  This obscures the traditional notion of 
a victim and a perpetrator.  For example, should two states wage aggres-
sive war against each other, the losing party may be both criminally lia-
ble, as well as the victim of aggression.  Therefore, a state may not be de-
terred by criminal sanctions, so long as they are confident in the success 
of their operation.  A court seeking credibility, such as the ICC, should 
not hear cases which base liability on factors other than the criminality of 
the actions of the accused.    
V.  APPLICATION OF ROME STATUTE ARTICLE 25(3) TO THE 
CRIME OF AGGRESSION  
Article 25 of the Rome Statute prescribes the guidelines for individ-
ual criminal responsibility.
63
  In particular, article 25(3) enumerates 
forms of criminal liability in addition to that of the principal perpetrator.  
                                                             
62 Rome Statute, art. 25(1).  
63 See Rome Statute, art. 25. 
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These forms of liability include involvement in a joint enterprise,
64
 or-
dering, soliciting, or inducing another to commit a crime,
65
 aiding, abet-
ting, or otherwise assisting in the commission of a crime,
66
 contributing 
to the commission of a crime,
67
 and finally, attempt to commit a crime.
68
  
The question is whether the crime of aggression, as a leadership crime, 
fits into the ICC‟s framework for liability.  Article 25(3) is applicable to 
all of the crimes over which the ICC has jurisdiction.  Accordingly, 
should the crime of aggression prove inconsistent with secondary liabili-
ty, logic suggests removing the crime of aggression, rather than drastical-
ly amending article 25(3), which would have ramifications on the prose-
cution of all crimes in the Rome Statute.   
The Coordinator for the Special Working Group has recognized the 
potential issues, claiming that the group‟s proposed definition of aggres-
sion, which criminalizes the planning, preparation, initiation, or waging a 
war of aggression,
69
 overrides the provisions in article 25 of the ICC.
70
  
This position is convincing, as the other crimes prosecuted in the ICC 
stipulate a mens rea, and then list substantive acts which satisfy the actus 
reus.  The crime of aggression, should the final draft resemble the current 
proposition, defines alternate forms of liability within the statute.    
The first problem with the proposed definition to the ICC is that the 
itemized forms of liability in the draft are inconsistent with the idea of a 
“leadership crime.”  The proposed draft retains the clause requiring that 
the person planning, preparing, initiating, etc., must have effective con-
trol over the political or military actions of a state, but this only com-
pounds the problem.  Can one reconcile the claim that an individual have 
effective control over the military when his sole contribution was assis-
tance in the preparation of a military campaign?  Would preparation in-
clude the general who prepared his troops in a manner consistent with his 
job regardless of the legality of their eventual military objective?  What 
about a government official who reallocates funds to assist a war effort, 
again regardless of the campaign‟s motive?  The problem is that by in-
cluding the actus reus, the statute stretches the concept of effective con-
                                                             
64 Id. art. 25(3)(a).  
65 Id. art. 25(3)(b).  
66 Id. art. 25(3)(c).  
67 Id. art. 25(3)(d).  
68 Id. art. 25(3)(f).  
69 See Special Working Group for the Crime of Aggression, supra note 49.  
70 Nicolaos Strapatsas, Is Article 25(3) of the ICC Statute “Compatible with the 
Crime of Aggression”, 19 FLA. J. INT‟L L. 155, 160 (2007).   
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trol.  Acts of preparation may not ordinarily be suggestive of effective 
control over the actual campaign, yet by including the word preparation, 
the ICC‟s justices may be tempted to deem remote acts of preparation as 
indicative of the effective control of the actor.  Perhaps the statute would 
be more useful if it were general in its terms, requiring only that an actor 
uses his effective control to wage aggressive war, thereby not predispos-
ing the court to a particular decision. 
The second problem is that the prescribed actus reus in article 25 
have a similar incompatibility with the concept of effective control, 
much in the way the proposed statute of the Special Working Group 
does.  Section 3(b) criminalizes the ordering, soliciting, or inducing the 
commission of a crime.
71
  Ordering and soliciting are consistent with ef-
fective control, and the concept of a leadership crime, yet inducement is 
not.  Inducement requires the conscious objective of an intermediary, al-
beit one pursued partially due to the persuasion from another.  If person 
A were to lead or persuade person B to commit the crime of aggression, 
person A‟s effective control is nullified by the will of person B.  It must 
not be said to be effective control if it is subject to the actions of an in-
termediary. In the event that person A forced the hand of person B, the 
ICC would protect person B either through the defense of duress in ar-
ticle 31
72
 or the defense of superior orders under article 33.
73
  The Rome 
Statute also permits criminalizing aiding and abetting and, in any other 
way, contributing to the commission of a crime.
74
  This form of liability 
would certainly produce adverse results in the prosecution of aggression.  
The statute only requires that the contribution to the criminal effort be 
intentional and made “with the aim of furthering the criminal activity.”
75
  
This would implicate a wide range of people, in a crime designed to 
prosecute a select few.  The various ways in which an individual may 
contribute to an aggressive war necessarily leads to the conclusion that 
the crime of aggression would no longer revolve around leadership or 
control, if the ICC were to prosecute it under its current statutes.  Not on-
ly would it be impractical for the ICC to prosecute so many individuals, 
but it would create a dangerous “slippery slope,” whereby the cutoff for 
                                                             
71 Rome Statute, art. 25(3)(b). 
72 Id. art. 31(1)(d).  
73 Id. art. 33.  
74 Id. art 25(3)(c). 
75 Id. art. 25(3)(d)(i).  
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liability would be indefinite.   
VI.  DEFENSES TO THE CRIME OF AGGRESSION UNDER THE 
U.N. CHARTER  
The current draft proposals by the Special Working Group require 
an initial factual finding by an outside body (usually the Security Council 
or another U.N. body) of state acts of aggression.
76
  Accordingly, an 
analysis of the validity of the ICC‟s jurisdiction over aggression should 
involve an inquiry into the U.N. Charter.  Of particular importance here, 
are the defenses put forth in the charter, which are not present in the 
Rome Statute.  This begs the question if the inclusion of aggression un-
der the ICC‟s jurisdiction necessitates an adoption of such defenses.  Ar-
ticle 31 of the Rome Statute provides a provision which does not limit 
the defenses available to defendants to those enumerated in the statute.
77
  
Article 21 gives the court the power to apply defenses provided for in 
applicable treaties and rules of international law.
78
  Presumably, this pro-
vision eradicates the discrepancy in the two documents.  However, the 
relevant inquiries necessary to reviewing a defense are best suited to be 
made by a political body, rather than a judicial one.The Security Council 
has the right to authorize the use of force by a state pursuant to chapter 
VII of the U.N. Charter.
79
  The Security Council‟s review is often criti-
cized as being laced with biases and political motives (particularly when 
attacking the strength of the P-5), yet it is precisely the task that the 
council was created for.  The Security Council‟s job is to protect and 
maintain peace.  It seems redundant for the Security Council to have the 
power to review and correct acts of aggression, only to pass it on to the 
ICC for further review.  This system once again implicates the interplay 
between jus ad bellum and jus in bello. Decisions regarding jus ad bel-
lum, regardless of whether the defendant is a state or an individual, are 
laced with political issues and should remain with the U.N.  Should the 
Council after determining the former issue then refer violations of jus in 
bello to the ICC, that would be appropriate.  Only in this regard is the 
complementary relationship between jus ad bellum and jus in bello kept 
                                                             
76 Keith A. Petty, Criminalizing Force: Resolving the Threshold Question for the 
Crime of Aggression in the Context of Modern Conflict, 33 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 105,107 
(2009). 
77 Rome Statute, art. 31(3).  
78 Id. art 21(1)(b).  
79 U.N. Charter, ch. VII.  
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intact.   
Article 51 of the U.N. charter allows a state to use force to defend 
itself against an armed attack.
80
  The Rome Statute does employ a self-
defense statute, yet it is strictly applied to individuals.
81
  This right of 
self-defense is expansive, and allows for anticipatory defense, giving a 
state the right to use force before actually being invaded.
82
  Similarly, 
states are allowed to use force for the protection of human rights where 
the territorial state is abusing its residents, a defense known as humanita-
rian intervention (though it is not explicitly stated in the charter).
83
  Both 
self-defense and humanitarian intervention are defenses afforded to the 
state.  To apply the defense to individual persons would dilute its mean-
ing.  For example, a state may have the right to use force if another state 
wages aggressive war against it, however, in the ICC, the justification of 
self-defense would require additional inquiries into the nexus between 
the individual‟s act of force and its impact on the defense effort.  Other-
wise, individuals would be permitted to wage solo missions of destruc-
tion against aggressive states.  Accordingly, should the ICC gain jurisdic-
tion over aggression, an accompanying self-defense statute would need 
to be adopted.  Or, in my opinion, exclude the crime of aggression from 
the ICC‟s jurisdiction, which is the preferential alternative.   
VII.  CONCLUSION  
Withdrawal of the crime of aggression from the jurisdiction of the 
ICC requires an alternative method of punishing those who commit said 
crime.  The complementary relationship between jus ad bellum and jus in 
bello necessitates a separation in review.  The determination of the crime 
of aggression should remain with a body which is equipped to under-
stand all the complexities which permeate issues of foreign relations.  
Determining whether that body is the Security Council or the General 
Assembly is not as critical as separating the rules guiding the decisions to 
use force with the rules guiding the means of force.  The latter is compat-
ible with the principles of the ICC, i.e. individual prosecution, victim-
centered, and politically neutral.  War crimes, genocide, and crimes 
                                                             
80 Id. art. 51.  
81 Rome Statute, art 31(1)(c).  
82 Van Schaack, supra note 7, at 336.  
83 Id. at 337.  
19
BOUND EDITION- HASKOS (DO NOT DELETE) 6/6/2011  6:59 PM 
268 PACE INT’L L. REV. [Vol.  XXIII::n 
against humanity provide a sufficiently comprehensive body of law to 
prosecute all violators of jus in bello.  Conversely, jus ad bellum, the 
crime of aggression, is best left outside the ICC‟s domain.                                  
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